

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 311210Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4258

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 2127

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, JO, XF

SUBJECT: SENATOR MCGOVERN'S TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. SUMMARY. THE KING AND SENATOR MCGOVERN DISCUSSED A WIDE RANGE OF MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES. THE KING REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM FROM JORDAN'S PERSPECTIVE. THE KING BLAMED ISRAEL FOR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS LAST WEEK. SENATOR MCGOVERN AVOIDED ATTRIBUTING BLAME, BUT SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY AND THE CONGRESS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH SOME LIMITATION ON AID TO ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY IF ISRAEL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE MORE FLEXIBILITY. THE SENATOR THOUGHT THAT THE BASICS FOR A SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR A RETURN TO THE 1967 BOUNDARIES AND A SOLID PEACE AGREEMENT FOR THE ISRAELIS. HE REPEATED THAT HE THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE SOME ENTITY ESTABLISHED FOR THE PALESTINIANS. KING OUTLINED HIS HOPES THAT THE ISSUE OF THE WEST BANK WOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER INDEPENDENCE FOR THE WEST BANK OR CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN AS VIABLE OPTIONS. KING REGRETTED ISRAELI INCAPACITY TO REACH A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN IN 1974 AND FELT THAT PRESENT SITUATION WAS MOST DEPRESSING

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HE HAD YET WITNESSED AND WAS DEEPLY AFRAID THAT THE

AREA IS HEADED TOWARD WAR. END SUMMARY.

2. SENATOR MCGOVERN MET FOR AN HOUR MARCH 30
WITH KING HUSSEIN ACCOMPANIED BY STAFF MEMBER STILLMAN AND
BARON AND AMBASSADOR.

3. SENATOR BEGAN CONVERSATION BY NOTING THAT
MANY PEOPLE IN THE AREA AND MOST IN THE U.S. CONSIDERED
KING HUSSEIN ALONG WITH PRESIDENT SADAT AS A
VOICE OF RATIONALITY AND REASON IN THE AREA.
HE ASKED FOR THE KING'S ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENT
SITUATION AND HOW HE LOOKED AT THE FUTURE.

4. KING WELCOMED THE SENATOR AND PROVIDED HIM
WITH A VERY LONG DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTICAL
REVIEW OF JORDAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE
LAST TWO DECADES. MOST OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY IS
FAMILIAR TO THE DEPARTMENT AND I WILL NOT REPEAT
HERE IN ANY EXTENSIVE DETAIL THE POINTS WHICH HE
MADE. IN SUM, HE COVERED JORDAN'S ATTACHMENT
TO THE WEST BANK, HIS OWN PERSONAL AND FAMILY TIES
TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA, THE JORDANIAN POSITION
ON THE WEST BANK AS IT HAS EVOLVED OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL YEARS, JORDANIAN PROPOSALS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
AND A PLEBISCITE UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AS
THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SOLVING THE WEST BANK-
PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, JORDAN'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A
NEGOTIATED DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS,
THE RABAT SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON
JORDAN IN THE INTER-ARAB, INTERNATIONAL,
AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS, THE SECRETARY'S CURRENT
MISSION AND HIS RETURN HOME AND THE KING'S
RESULTING VERY SERIOUS PREOCCUPATION WITH THE QUESTION
OF A POSSIBLE CONFLICT. AT ONE POINT THE KING SAID
THAT HE FELT THE MOST DEPRESSED THIS WEEK THAT HE
HAD FOR YEARS AND THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION
RESEMBLED THE LEAD-UP TO THE 1967 WAR.

5. KING THEN TALKED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE DONE
FOR THE FUTURE. HE BROACHED THE IDEA OF A POSSIBLE
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE
PROBLEMS OF THE AREA. THE SENATOR ENDORSED THE
STUDY OF THE IDEA AND ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT.
I TOLD HIM THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN GIVEN SOME
CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON, BUT WE THOUGHT THAT
THE ADDITION OF A NUMBER OF PEOPLE NOT DIRECTLY
RELATED TO THE PROBLEM WOULD THEN TO RESULT IN
UNHELPFUL AND PROPAGANDISTIC DEBATE. WE WERE DETERMINED

TO TRY TO MAINTAIN FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE NEGOTIATING FRONT AND WE WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPROACH COULD DO IT. THE KING THEN SAID HE THOUGHT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL APPROACH HAD MERIT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO DECIDE ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE PROBLEM COULD GO FORWARD. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNSC, CONSIDERATION COULD BE HELPFUL BY REAFFIRMING THE RESOLVE OF THE MAJOR NATIONS OF THE WORLD TO SEEK A SOLUTION.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 2127

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

6. THE KING TOUCHED ON SOME OF THE BILATERAL US-JORDANIAN QUESTIONS WHICH WILL PREOCCUPY OUR RELATIONS IN NEAR FUTURE. HE WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WORLD-WIDE MILITARY AID HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY CUT AND HE WONDERED WHETHER I HAD ANYTING TO TELL HIM ON THAT POINT. I SAID THAT AS FAR AS I KNEW NO ALLOCATIONS HAD BEEN MADE OF THE AID APPROPRIATION AND I WOULD HAVE TO BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM ABOUT THIS LATER. THE SENATOR REMARKED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE CONGRESS WAS GOING TO PAY INCREASING ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI AID AND THAT THIS HE HOPED WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE SECRETARY AND TO OTHERS IN MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS. NO ONE IN THE CONGRESS THOUGHT THAT THE SECRETARY HAD NOT DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE. MANY WERE PREPARED TO CONCEDE THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL SHOULD BE SUPPORT

PREMISED ON THE RETURN OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND
THE CONCLUSION OF SOLID PEACE AGREEMENTS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN ON SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL
WHATEVER IT CHOOSES TO DO. KING SAID HE WAS MOST
GRATIFIED TO HEAR OF THIS POSITION AND HOPED THAT
THE CONGRESS WOULD PURSUE THIS LINE. HE PERSONALLY
FELT THE ISRAELIS BORE MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE SECRETARY'S ACTIVITIES
AND HE COULD NOT SEE HOW, IF THE U.S. COULD

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NOT GET BACK FIFTY KILOMETERS OF SAND, IT EXPECTED
TO BE ABLE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE ON THE
DIFFICULT ISSUES OF THE GOLAN, WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM.
THE KING ALSO EXPLAINED HIS NEED FOR AIR DEFENSE.

7. THE SENATOR AND THE KING DISCUSSED THE QUESTION
OF JERUSALEM. THE KING MADE THE POINT THAT THE PARTS OF
IT FORMERLY UNDER ARAB CONTROL WOULD RETURN TO ARAB
SOVEREIGNTY, BUT THERE WAS NO REASON WHY IT
COULD NOT BE AN OPEN CITY AND THE CAPITAL BOTH
OF ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN ENTITY.

8. THE KING OUTLINED FOR THE SENATOR IN SOME DETAIL
HIS VIEWS ON WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST PRACTICABLE
WAY TO SOLVE THE ISSUES OF THE WEST BANK. THERE
SHOULD BE BY ALL MEANS SOME EXERCISE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION UNDER FREE CONDITIONS SUBJECT TO
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. PALESTINIANS IN THE
WEST BANK SHOULD BE ASKED TO DECIDE NOT ONLY WHO
THEIR LEADERS WOULD BE, BUT ALSO THEIR FORM OF
GOVERNMENT AND FUTURE RELATIONSHIP TO JORDAN
OR ANY OTHER STATE IN THE AREA. IF THEY WANTED
IT, THIS COULD MEAN FULL INDEPENDENCE.

9. THE KING OUTLINED BRIEFLY FOR THE SENATOR THE
SORT OF HELP WHICH HE WAS PROVIDING TO OMAN AND
THE OTHER STATES IN THE GULF. HE ALSO INDICATED
THAT HE INTENDED TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA SOON AND
WOULD HAVE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS WITH KING KHALID
AND PRINCE FAHD. UP UNTIL THEN IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
FOR HIM TO COMMENT IN ANY INFORMED WAY ON HOW HE
THOUGHT THE SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA WOULD EVOLVE.
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